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The Effect of Joint Custody on Marriage and Divorce
*
 
Since the 1970s almost all states have introduced a form of joint custody after divorce. We 
analyze the causal effect of these custody law reforms on the incidence of marriage and 
divorce. Our identification strategy exploits the different timing of reforms across states and 
the control group of divorcing couples without minors. Estimations based on state panel data 
suggest that the introduction of joint custody led to a long-run increase in marriage rates. 
There is no convincing evidence for an impact of joint custody on divorce rates. In sum, joint 
custody has increased the stock of married people and dampened the persistent downturn in 
marriage. Our empirical evidence is fully consistent with the supposition that these additional 
marriages are the result of an increased incentive of men to marry. 
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The American family has undergone radical changes over the last decades. Marriage rates have
been falling over the last thirty years and cohabitation has emerged as an important social
institution. Divorce rates rose sharply starting in the mid-1960s, peaked in the early 1980s and
have been declining since then (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2007a). This downturn can partly be
explained by the decline in the incidence of marriage but is also due to greater stability of younger
cohorts. The share of the population who are divorced, however, continued to rise through the
1980s and 1990s and has only recently begun to decrease (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2007b).
These dramatic demographic changes came along with an increased economic independence
of women and radical changes in family law. Of course, the causal link between demographic,
economic, and legal changes is non-trivial. The economic literature has focused so far on changes
in divorce law. In particular, scholars have studied the impact of the move from mutual consent
to unilateral divorce laws and changes in the laws regarding the division of matrimonial property.1
Thereby they have furthered our understanding of the eﬀect of divorce law on intra-household-
bargaining and explained part of the changes in family formation, dissolution and behavior within
marriage over the last decades.
A further aspect of family law, namely custody law, has gained hardly any attention in
the literature.2 The allocation of custody, however, is a crucial aspect of every divorce since it
governs the actual post-divorce living arrangements and may have important welfare implications.
Many states have changed their custody law fundamentally since the 1970s. Traditionally, after
divorce one parent was assigned sole custody and usually the mother (or occasionally the father)
was exclusively responsible for the child. The so-called non-custodian parent was restricted to
speciﬁed visitation rights. In 1973, Indiana was the ﬁrst state who introduced a law favoring
joint custody (Brinig and Buckley, 1998). Since then it spread to nearly all states (see Table 1
and Figure 1).3
There are various forms of joint custody. One typically distinguishes between joint legal
custody and joint physical custody. Joint legal custody means that both parents share the
right and the obligation of making major decisions about their child’s upbringing (e.g. about
schooling, religion, and health care). Joint physical custody means that the child spends a
signiﬁcant amount of time with each parent. In any case policy-makers intended thereby to
mitigate the pain of divorce for all parties involved. Since then an ongoing debate – across
academic disciplines including economics, law, psychology and sociology – between proponents
and opponents of joint custody has started. Researchers have primarily focused on the eﬀect
1Most of the papers have studied the eﬀects of these laws on divorce rates (Peters, 1986; Allen, 1992; Peters,
1992; Friedberg, 1998; Wolfers, 2006). Other outcome variables are marriage (Rasul, 2003, 2006a; Matouschek and
Rasul, 2008), marriage and fertility (Alesina and Giuliano, 2007; Drewianka, 2008), marriage-speciﬁc investments
(Stevenson, 2007), female labor supply (Gray, 1998; Genadek, Stock and Stoddard, 2007), various child-outcomes
(Johnson and Mazingo, 2000; Gruber, 2004; Cáceres-Delpiano and Giolito, 2008), and domestic violence and
suicide (Dee, 2003; Stevenson and Wolfers, 2006).
2The only paper that has previously examined the impact of custody law on divorce is Brinig and Buckley
(1998). They ﬁnd a negative eﬀect of the introduction of joint custody laws on divorce rates. We are not aware
of any attempt to study the impact of custody law on marriage rates.
3In Europe, joint custody has been introduced, for instance, in Sweden in 1976 (Jänterä-Jareborg, 2003), in
Norway in 1981 (Sverdrup and Lødrup, 2003), in Germany in 1997 (Dethloﬀ and Martiny, 2003), and in Austria
in 2001 (Roth, 2003).
2of diﬀerent custody arrangements on children’s well-being after divorce. Proponents of joint
custody typically argue that children beneﬁt from ongoing support and resources from both
parents. This is captured in various dimensions such as behavioral and emotional adjustment
(Bauserman, 2002), economic well-being (Seltzer, 1991; Del Boca and Ribero, 1998), educational
attainment (Teng Wah, 2006) and parental involvement (Bowman and Ahrons, 1985; Huang,
Han and Garﬁnkel, 2003), among others. Opponents object that children under joint custody
are exposed to ongoing parental conﬂict (Kuehl, 1989). However, the causal relationship between
certain custody arrangements and child outcomes is far from clear and the empirical evidence is
mostly inconclusive.
In this paper, we are concerned with an even more fundamental question: We explore if
the introduction of laws permitting joint custody of children after divorce has an impact on the
incidence of marriage and divorce. The move from sole custody to joint custody may cause a
redistribution of the gains from marriage between spouses (redistribution eﬀect). The party who
gains from this redistribution (supposedly the man) faces a higher incentive to marry after the
reform. If both parties are in favor of joint custody we should observe an increased incentive of
each partner and marriage rates should increase after the introduction of joint custody. Secondly,
the option of joint custody may aﬀect the expected utility in the state of divorce and the expected
cost of the divorce process (cost eﬀects). If joint custody reduces the expected monetary and
emotional cost of divorce the reform may increase the likelihood of divorce. Finally, joint custody
may also aﬀect the spouses’ behavior during marriage and change their incentive to make marital-
speciﬁc investments, such as in children (behavioral eﬀect). If it causes an increase in aggregate
incentive to invest we should observe an increase in the value of marriage and a raise in marriage
rates. Higher levels of marital-speciﬁc investments should in turn reduce the likelihood of divorce.
There are several potential countervailing eﬀects of joint custody on the incentive to marry
and to divorce. In many cases the outcome depends on the spouses’ preference orderings over
certain custody arrangements. From a theoretical point of view, it is therefore a priori not clear
whether the introduction of joint custody should increase or decrease the incidence of marriage
and divorce. It remains an empirical question if and how joint custody aﬀects marriage and
divorce rates.
In order to identify the causal eﬀect of joint custody on the incidence of marriage and divorce
we exploit the (i) variation occurring from the diﬀerent timing of joint custody reforms across
the United States and (ii) the control group of divorcing couples without minors. We provide
evidence that after the introduction of joint custody, marriage rates increased signiﬁcantly and
permanently in adopting states. This economically and statistically signiﬁcant result is robust
to a number of alternative speciﬁcations. In contrast, we ﬁnd no convincing evidence for an
impact of joint custody on divorce rates. In sum, joint custody had a clear positive impact on
the number of married people. It increased the stock of married people by about 1:5 percentage
points and dampened the ongoing decline in marriage rates, which could be observed over the
last thirty years. All of our results are robust to controlling for the adoption of unilateral divorce
laws.
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, we provide evidence on
unintended consequences of custody law reforms. No attention was given to the potential con-
3sequences on the incidence of marriage when laws permitting the joint custody of children after
divorce were introduced. Second, this paper clariﬁes the diﬀerent layers of selection which have
to be considered when studying the eﬀect of joint custody on post-divorce (child) outcomes.
Finally, our results should be of considerable interest to policy-makers. For varying reasons,
the public worries about the decline in marriage rates and policy-makers are prepared to act in
concrete ways to encourage marriage and to prevent divorce.
The paper is organized as follows: First, we discuss potential eﬀects of joint custody on the
incentive to marry and to divorce. The next section describes the data. Then we explain our
estimation strategy, present our estimation results, and report on several robustness checks. In
addition, we give some supporting evidence on the dissemination of joint custody awards, and
on trends in the attitude toward marriage. Finally, we summarize and conclude the paper.
2 Theoretical considerations
In economic analyzes of the family a child is generally modeled as a local public good (Weiss
and Willis, 1985). During marriage, a relationship of trust and proximity, no free-rider problems
arise and the optimal level of child well-being is guaranteed. Here both the amount of time
that parents spend with their child and child expenditures are optimally chosen to the child’s
well-being. However, after the breakdown of marriage ineﬃciencies may arise. Divorce law
typically necessitates a speciﬁed division of matrimonial property – comprising tangible and
intangible assets – in order to dissolve marriage legally. Concerning child custody the division
was traditionally very sharp: One parent became sole custodian and the other – the non-custodian
– was restricted to speciﬁed visitation rights.
In this new situation, where the family is separated in two households, it is no longer possible
that the parents spend time with their child jointly. In particular, the non-custodian’s tight time
constraint may aﬀect the child’s well-being adversely per se. On top of that the non-custodian
also loses control over child expenditures. He has hardly any opportunity to monitor and enforce
an optimal level of child expenditures. This may reduce his incentive to spend on the child
(Weiss and Willis, 1985).4 On the other hand, the custodian will not internalize the eﬀects of
his child-related actions on the non-custodian. In sum, the return to child-investments is greater
during marriage than after divorce. Consequently, an ineﬃciently low level of child well-being
will be observed in the divorce state.
Why does joint custody matter? There are several ways in which the move from a regime
where only sole custody is available to an institutional setting with (the possibility of) joint
custody may aﬀect the decision to marry and divorce. In our analysis we do not assume anything
about the procedural method how joint custody can be obtained. Joint custody may be achieved
by a parental agreement or may be awarded by a judge. Further, we do not distinguish between
joint legal custody and joint physical custody. We think of joint custody as a form that shares
the rights and obligations concerning the child between divorced parents more equally compared
to sole custody. Put diﬀerently, in the state of divorce with sole custody, the custodian’s rate
4In fact, this may explain the common phenomenon that non-custodian parents do not comply with court
mandated child support awards.
4of return to child-investments is higher compared to the non-custodian’s rate. We think of joint
custody as a situation where these two rates of return come closer.
In order to discuss potential eﬀects of the introduction of joint custody, we have to consider
diﬀerent preference orderings over certain custody arrangements. We presume that parents are
altruistic towards their children in the sense that their utility depends on the welfare of their
children. Consequently, it is a natural starting point that parents are interested in spending time
with their children and that they want to remain custodian after divorce. We assume that each




i for all i 6= j. With respect to joint custody we do not make any restrictive assumptions.
It is a priori not clear whether parents prefer to be sole custodians (Si
i  Ji) or to share parental
rights and obligations with their former spouse under a joint custody (Si
i  Ji). In sum, this
gives two possible utility orderings for each parent i
Si
i  Ji  S
j
i and Ji  Si
i  S
j
i for all i 6= j: (1)
Based on these two preference orderings we discuss the impact of the introduction of joint custody
on the incidence of marriage and divorce. Thereby, we distinguish three diﬀerent channels, a
redistribution eﬀect, a cost eﬀect and a behavioral eﬀect.
Redistribution eﬀect If both parents prefer joint custody over sole custody the switch from
a sole custody regime to a joint custody regime is clearly appreciated by both. In this case the
reform should increase the incentive to marry for both sexes. If one or both parents are in favor of
sole custody, the joint custody reform may cause a redistribution of the gains from marriage. The
party who gains (loses) from this redistribution faces a higher (lower) incentive to marry. To gain
more insights we distinguish between three diﬀerent sole custody regimes to reform: (i) a sole
custody regime with maternal preference, (ii) a sole custody regime with paternal preference, and
(iii) a sole custody regime with a gender-neutral rule (e.g. the ‘best interest of the child’ rule). A
sole custody regime with maternal (paternal) preference means that in principle child custody is
granted to the mother (father). There are diﬀerent types of sole custody regimes with a gender-
neutral rule, for instance, courts award custody to the primary-caretaker5 or courts aim directly
at the best interest of the child, without applying any presumption.6
Let us ﬁrst consider the reform of a sole custody regime with maternal preference. This
clearly increases the man’s incentive to marry irrespective of his preferences. Under the sole
custody regime the child was (most likely) living with the mother and the father was restricted
to speciﬁed visitation rights. However, after the joint custody reform, the father can expect to
spend a substantial amount of time with his child. Depending on the women’s preferences her
incentive to marry may increase or decrease. If she prefers sole custody over joint custody her
incentive to marry is reduced by the reform. However, if she is in favor of joint custody her
incentive to marry increases as well. The same reasoning applies vice versa to a sole custody
5This is the parent who was primarily responsible for the child during marriage.
6In the US traditionally a sole custody regime with strict paternal preference was in place; even when the
father had committed the marital fault. This changed in the nineteenth-century, when courts began to award
custody to the mother when the father was at fault (Mnookin, 1975). In the twentieth century the focus has
shifted from parental fault to the interests of the child. This ﬁrst resulted in a sole custody regime with maternal
preference and became later a gender-neutral rule system (Brinig and Buckley, 1998).
5regime with paternal preference.
We can conclude that if we switch from sole custody regime with maternal (paternal) pref-
erence, to a joint custody regime, the aggregate incentive to marry due to the redistribution
eﬀect unambiguously increases if women (men) prefer joint custody over sole custody. If not, the
incentive of women (men) decreases and the aggregate incentive may increase or decrease. If we
presume a sole custody regime with a gender-neutral rule, the redistribution eﬀect of the joint
custody reform on the incentive to marry does not only depend on preferences, but also on the
parents’ perceived probability to get sole custody assigned.
In practice, mother sole placement has been the dominant arrangement in the US for a long
time. In fact, its decline since the mid 1980s has been almost exclusively due to the increasing
number of joint custody arrangements and only to a very small extent due to increases of male
sole custodians (Cancian and Meyer, 1998). Therefore, under realistic circumstances we can
expect that the introduction of joint custody has increased men’s incentive to marry.
Cost eﬀects There are possible cost eﬀects which may alter the incentive to divorce. Firstly,
the (additional) option of joint custody after divorce may aﬀect the expected utility in the state
of divorce and aﬀect the divorce decision of existing marriages. Let us ﬁrst assume that both
parents strictly prefer to be sole custodian over any joint custody agreement. If we switch from
a sole custody regime with maternal preference to a joint custody regime, the expected utility
in the state of divorce should increase for men and decrease for women. If we start from a sole
custody regime with paternal preference we would observe reversed eﬀects. In both cases, the
impact on the aggregate incentive to divorce is ambiguous.7 In the case where both parents are
in favor of a joint custody agreement the aggregate incentive to divorce clearly increases.8 A
further potential cost eﬀect operates through the cost of the divorce process. Halla and Hölzl
(2007) show that part of the parents who would not be able to ﬁnd a mutually binding custody
agreement in the sole custody regime can ﬁnd an agreement in a joint custody regime. This is
equivalent to a reduction in the cost of divorce.9 This cost eﬀect should increase the aggregate
incentive to divorce.
Behavioral eﬀect Finally, there is a potential behavioral eﬀect. The availability of joint
custody after divorce may aﬀect the spouses’ behavior during marriage. In particular, there is
a possible impact on the parents’ incentives to invest in the child, or more generally to make
marital-speciﬁc investments. Whether the introduction of joint custody increases or decreases
the incentive to invest is a priori not clear. It depends on the speciﬁc sole custody regime, on the
parents’ (risk) preferences, their behavior under uncertainty and on their expectations. However,
if the joint custody reform causes an increase in their aggregate incentive to invest, the value
of marriage rises. This increases the incentive to marry and we should observe an increase in
marriage rates. Symmetrically, if joint custody decreases the aggregate incentive to invest we
should observe a fall in marriage rates.10
7Again, under a sole custody regime with a gender-neutral rule the parents’ perceived probabilities (to get sole
custody assigned) are decisive.
8For a similar argument, see Estin (1998).
9In fact, their empirical analysis shows that the introduction of joint custody in Austria enables more parents
to divorce by mutual consent (low cost) versus divorce by fault (high cost). However, they do not ﬁnd any impact
of the joint custody reform on the incidence of divorce.
10Brinig and Buckley (1998) us the descriptive term ‘bonding’. Their bonding theory suggests that if parents
anticipate joint custody in the event of divorce, they will bond more closely with their child.
6Moreover, if we think of divorce as a (partly) endogenous event, in the sense that the likelihood
of divorce is determined by the level of the spouses’ marriage-speciﬁc investment, the introduction
of joint custody could aﬀect the likelihood of divorce as well (Rasul, 2006b). In the case of an
increase in the aggregate investment, moving to joint custody should reduce he probability of
divorce and divorce rates are expected to fall. Whereas if due to the joint custody reform the
aggregate incentive to investment falls, divorce rates should go up.
To sum up, it is a priori not clear whether introduction of joint custody should increase
or decrease the aggregate incentive to marry and to divorce. In each case there are possibly
countervailing eﬀects and it remains an empirical question if and how joint custody aﬀects the
incidence of marriage and divorce.
3 Data
First of all, we have to deﬁne a measure of the incidence of marriage and divorce. The standard in
the literature seems to be crude marriage and divorce rates – the number of marriages (divorces)
per 1;000 of the total population (e.g. Friedberg, 1998; Wolfers, 2006). However, these two
variables may hide much of the underlying variation of interest, because the population ‘at
risk’ is not considered properly. In case of marriage, the best measure would be the number
of marriages per 1;000 of the non-married population.11 In order to quantify the incidence of
divorce we would prefer to calculate the number of divorces per 1;000 of the married population.
However, there is a trade-oﬀ between the accuracy of the measurement and the extent of
available data. Unfortunately, the stock of (non)-married people is not available, except for
the years in which the decennial US census has been conducted.12 Therefore, we quantify the
incidence of marriage and divorce in a ﬁrst step based on series on the number of cases per
1;000 of the population between 15 and 55 years of age. People in this age group should be the
relevant sub-population with respect to custody issues. In particular, we use the absolute number
of marriages and divorces from the annual editions of the Vital Statistics for all states from 1969
to 2003 and combine this information with state-level population data from the Reading Survey
of Epidemiology and End Results provided by the National Bureau of Economic Research.13
For simplicity, we will refer to our measures of incidence as marriage and divorce rates. These
series can be constructed for all states from 1969 through 2003 and should be suﬃciently long to
cleanly distinguish the causal eﬀects of joint custody from pre-existing trends in marriage and
divorce rates. These series are used to identify whether there is any causal eﬀect of joint custody
on the incidence of marriage and divorce.
In a second step, to check the robustness of our results, we use a proxy for the stock of
married people. This proxy is constructed on information on the stock of married people from
the decennial US Census from 1960 to 1990 and on the ﬂow into and out of marriage from the
11However, one could also argue that married people are at risk to divorce and re-marry.
12In principal the Current Population Survey can be used to construct a proxy of the stock of (non)-married
population on a state-level. However, this strategy is potentially problematic since several states are grouped
together between 1968 and 1972 and others are grouped together between 1973 and 1976.
13The number of marriages is not available for ﬁve state-years (CA 1991, DC 1999, and OK 2001   2003) and
for the number of divorces for 76 state-years (CA 1991   1995, 1999, CO 1995   2000, HI 2003, IN 1991   2003,
LA 1991   2001, OK 2001   2003).
7annual editions of the Vital Statistics (details are provided below). This allows us to construct
series on the number of divorces per 1;000 married persons.
4 Identiﬁcation strategy
The ﬁrst joint custody statute was passed in Indiana in 1973, and since then shared parenting
has spread to nearly all 50 states.14 Examining Figure 1 shows that no systematic geographical
patterns are observable. The share of treated population and the number of treated states evolve
uniformly over time, see Figure 2. This indicates that no particularly small nor particularly large
states have been early or late adopters. The diﬀerent timing of joint custody reforms across the
US seems to provide a useful quasi-experimental setting to study the causal eﬀect of joint custody
on marriage and divorce.
We examine the period from 1969 through 2003 for all states excluding Nevada.15 Figure 3
shows the development of marriage and divorce rates. We observe a sustained decline in marriage
rates. Divorce rates at ﬁrst rose sharply, peaked in the early 1980s and have been declining since
then. Our research design enables a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DD) approach. The standard DD
estimator imposes the restrictive assumptions of an immediate and constant response to the
policy intervention. Since these assumptions may not hold in case of the joint custody reform,
we follow the empirical strategy of Wolfers (2006) which imposes little structure on the dynamic
eﬀects of the policy intervention. In particular, we estimate a DD panel ﬁxed-eﬀects model,






















where s are state ﬁxed-eﬀects and t are year ﬁxed-eﬀects. JCr
s;t denotes a series of binary
variables equal to one if a state has introduced joint custody r years ago. Our empirical strategy
is to identify whether joint custody law explains the change in marriage/divorce rates between
states adopting joint custody at a diﬀerent point in time. Therefore, the identiﬁcation of r is
guaranteed by variation across states and across years in which states adopted joint custody.
Our ﬂexible speciﬁcation allows us to trace out the full adjustment path of marriage and divorce
rates. The method of estimation is population weighted least squares and robust standard errors
– allowing for clustering by state – are calculated throughout (Bertrand, Duﬂo and Mullainathan,
2004).
In further speciﬁcations we also consider the possibility that the introduction of joint custody
is correlated with the move from mutual consent to unilateral divorce laws, UDr
s;t. Under mutual
consent law both spouses need to agree to divorce. Unilateral divorce law allows either party
14The coding of the states enacted laws permitting joint custody follows (Brinig and Buckley, 1998).
15We disregard Nevada from our analysis since its marriage market is (most probably due to Las Vegas) very
diﬀerent compared to the other states. Table 2 shows that the average marriage rate of Nevada is about twelve
times higher than the average of all other states. Its divorce rate is nearly the triple of the rest of the US.
8to ﬁle for divorce without the consent of the other. This switch re-assigns the right to divorce
from being held jointly, to being held individually.16 Wolfers (2006) has shown that unilateral
divorce law led to an immediate spike in the divorce rate that dissipates over time and results
in an eventual decline in divorce rates. Most recently, Rasul (2006a); Matouschek and Rasul
(2008) provide convincing evidence that the introduction of unilateral divorce is also responsible
for the signiﬁcantly and permanently decline in marriage rates in adopting states.17 We follow
the coding for unilateral divorce law of Wolfers (2006) (see Table 1) and control for the adoption
of unilateral divorce law in an equivalent way as for joint custody.
Moreover, we add speciﬁcations where we control for the gross state product (GSP) per capita
and the sex-race-distribution, denoted by Xs;t The literature has documented quite diﬀerent
marriage patterns across black and white citizens (Bennett, Bloom and Craig, 1989; Brien, 1997;
Stevenson and Wolfers, 2007a). To capture the sex-race-distribution of each state we control
for the share of the total population of sex g and of race h, where h is white, black and other.
In further robustness checks we will not only controlling for the sex-race-distribution but for
the sex-race-age-distribution of each state. We hesitate to control for the age component in the
baseline speciﬁcation since joint custody may have aﬀected fertility behavior.18
5 Estimation results
We ﬁrst discuss the eﬀect of joint custody on marriage rates. Then we present our analysis of
divorce rates, where we employ various dependent variables and diﬀerent methods. In a ﬁnal
step we consider the outcome stock of married people. This should give us the net eﬀect of the
two ﬂow measures.
5.1 The eﬀect on marriage rates
Results for marriage rates are summarized in Table 3. Speciﬁcation (I) shows the baseline results
with state and year ﬁxed-eﬀects only. Speciﬁcation (II) adds a series of binary variables equal
to one if a state has introduced unilateral divorce law r years ago. Finally, speciﬁcation (III)
additionally includes the gross state product and the sex-race-distribution for each state. Each
speciﬁcation shows that the introduction of joint custody had no immediate impact on marriage
rates, but we ﬁnd a large and statistically signiﬁcant increase in the marriage rate starting ﬁve
years after the introduction of joint custody. The yearly rate of marriages per 1;000 of the
population between 15 and 55 years of age (henceforth adults) increased on average by 1:14 in
treatment states (compared to control states) in the period of ﬁve to six years after the reform.
The average number of yearly marriages per 1;000 adults is 17:45 in the sample. The eﬀect of
the joint custody reform grows over time. Seven to eight years after the reform we observe an
16Since then there is a vivid debate in the economics literature whether the move from mutual consent to
unilateral divorce laws has caused the large rise in divorce rates (Peters, 1986; Allen, 1992; Peters, 1992; Friedberg,
1998; Wolfers, 2006).
17This result helps to reinterpret and reconcile the earlier ﬁndings on the relation between unilateral divorce
law and divorce rates. First the introduction of unilateral divorce caused the divorce of bad matches (initial spike
in divorce rate), and, second it has changed the selection into marriage. Couples who would have married under
mutual consent did no do so under unilateral divorce (permanent decrease in marriage rates). Since bad matches
did not marry, we observed a decline in divorce rates.
18We are not aware of any study considering an eﬀect of joint custody on fertility.
9eﬀect of 1:64 additional marriages in the treatment states relative to the control states. The
full eﬀect of the reform after ﬁfteen years following the adoption of joint custody is equal to
additional 3:68 marriages per 1;000 adults.
Such a growing impact of the introduction of joint custody over time seems plausible and
supports our causal interpretation. A process of behavioral change requires a signiﬁcant period
of time and we would not expect an immediate response. First, it takes some time until joint
custody is assigned and there might be a slow diﬀusion of information on the new custody law.19
Moreover, people have to observe divorced couples who share joint custody and learn that this
is actually a good option. Only after potentially beneﬁcial eﬀects of the law on divorce become
evident, we expect an eﬀect of joint custody on the incidence of marriage.
The result is also not sensitive to the speciﬁc modeling of the dynamic eﬀects of the reform.
For instance, if we pool three years to generate the binary variables capturing the eﬀects of
the reform (see Table 4) we ﬁnd the same pattern. While most of our control variables are
statistically signiﬁcant explanatory variables of the marriage rate, their inclusion has little impact
on the eﬀect of joint custody as such. In accordance with Rasul (2003, 2006a); Matouschek and
Rasul (2008) we ﬁnd that marriage rates declined signiﬁcantly and permanently in states which
have switched from mutual consent divorce to unilateral divorce.20 Similarly, the impact of the
divorce law reform also grows over time in absolute terms. So a separate eﬀect of joint custody
and unilateral divorce law can be established. Notably, the eﬀect of joint custody is quantitatively
more important than that of unilateral divorce law. For instance, speciﬁcation (III) in Table 4
suggests that the marriage rate decreased on average by 1:12 per year in the period of ten to
twelve years after the divorce law reform; the corresponding eﬀect of the joint custody reform is
2:02.
We test the sensitivity of this result to a number of alternative speciﬁcations. Firstly, if we in
addition control for whether states have also introduced an equitable division of property across
spouses in divorce, the qualitative results do not change. Secondly, we examine the robustness to
the sample chosen. To test the importance of the time period chosen we skip in turn single years.
It turns out that the omission of particular years does not inﬂuence our results. We also omit, in
turn, single states.21 For instance, we drop the most populated states, California and New York,
from the analysis. California is also one of the earlier adopters of joint custody. As speciﬁcations
(R1-I) and (R1-II) in Table 5 show our results are not very sensitive to these modiﬁcations of
the sample.
Further, we check whether the increase in marriage rates postdated the change in custody
law and we include in speciﬁcation (R1-III) leads for the introduction of joint custody. The
coeﬃcients on the binary variables capturing the periods prior to the joint custody law are
individually and jointly statistically insigniﬁcant. The coeﬃcients on the lags hardly changed.
So the timing evidence supports our causal interpretation between joint custody and marriage.
Finally, one might be concerned with reversion to the mean. For instance, if marriage markets
have been out of equilibrium in 1968 and if treatment states were further from their long-run
19In Section 6 we show that the probability of a joint custody award increases by three percentage points each
year after the introduction of joint custody.
20However, this is more evident based on the speciﬁcation in Table 4 compared to that in Table 3.
21Detailed output on all estimations is available upon request.
10equilibrium, there would have been convergence of marriage rates of treatment and control states.
Speciﬁcation (R1-IV) therefore controls for the share of married population in 1960, interacted
with a linear time trend. In speciﬁcation (R1-V) we interact the historical share of married
population with year ﬁxed-eﬀects. The results provide no evidence for convergence in marriage
rates over time and the eﬀect of joint custody remains positive and statistically signiﬁcant.
The second set of robustness checks is summarized in Table 6. We repeat all our alternative
speciﬁcations from Table 5, however, not only controlling for the sex-race-distribution but also
for the sex-race-age-distribution of each state. In particular, we control for the share of the total
population of sex g, of race h, and in age group i where h is white, black and other, and i is
0   14, 15   19, ..., 60   64 and 65+ (12 groups). The eﬀect of joint custody remains positive
and statistically signiﬁcant when this set of 72 control variables is included.
Finally, in our third set of robustness checks (see Table 7) we include also state-speciﬁc linear
time trends. This set of speciﬁcations gives our most conservative estimates of the impact of
joint custody. However, the results are consistently positive and statistically signiﬁcant across
all speciﬁcations.
5.2 The eﬀect on divorce rates
In this section we apply an equivalent estimation procedure to examine the eﬀect of joint custody
on divorce rates. The baseline results are summarized in Table 8. In general, there is no
discernable eﬀect of joint custody on divorce rates.22 However, speciﬁcations (II) and (III)
suggest that joint custody might have increased divorce rates starting ﬁfteen years after the
reform. We ﬁnd an increase in the yearly rate of divorces per 1;000 adults by 1:13 and 1:16 in
treatment states (compared to control states). The average number of yearly divorces per 1;000
adults is 8:25 in the sample. Since an eﬀect of the reform that kicks in with such a considerable
lag is a bit peculiar, we will reﬁne our measurement of the incidence of divorce below. The
baseline results may not be fully convincing, since our dependent variable does not capture the
correct population at risk to divorce and second, it comprises divorces of couples without minors
at the time of divorce, who by deﬁnition are not aﬀected by the reform.
Since joint custody increases the marriage rate, there are more people at-risk to divorce
and divorces per 1;000 adults may be an inappropriate metric. Consequently, we should use
divorces per 1;000 married persons as a dependent variable. As pointed out above, the stock of
married persons is not ready available, except for the years in which the decennial US Census
has been conducted. However, we have been successful in constructing a measure of the stock
of married persons for the years in between. We combine information on the stock of married
people from the decennial US Census from 1960 to 1990 with information on the ﬂow into and
out of marriage from the annual editions of the Vital Statistics.23 This gives us a proxy variable
22The results on unilateral divorce show the pattern described by Wolfers (2006). We ﬁnd an immediate spike
in divorce rates after the introduction of unilateral divorce that dissipates over time and an eventual decline in
divorce rates.
23In particular, we take for each state the number of married women in 1960, add the absolute number of
marriages and subtract the absolute number of divorces of the years 1961 to 1969. Then we compare the resulting
number with the actual number of married women in 1970. In most cases (82:7 percent) the diﬀerence between
our auxiliary number and the actual number of married women is positive, i.e. the deaths and migration of
married women outweigh the immigration of married women. In the remaining 17:3 percent of the cases, we
observe net immigration of married women. We assume that the sum of deaths and (im)migration of married
11for the share of married (fe)males for all states from 1969 through 2000, see Figure 4. The share
or married females does not equal the share of married males within a given state and year.
This diﬀerence can be explained by diﬀerent principal residences of spouses, for instance, due to
weekly commuting. Since we have a priori no presumption whether the share of married females
or males is the right metric, we will use three diﬀerent measures, the share of married females,
males and an average of both.
Table 9 summarizes the results of the estimation of the eﬀect of joint custody on the number
of divorces per 1;000 married females. This estimation allows for the impact of joint custody
on the size of the population at-risk to divorce. However, switching to the new measurement of
the incidence of divorce does not change the result. Again, the positive eﬀect of joint custody
on divorce rates starting ﬁfteen years after the reform remains statistically signiﬁcant at least in
speciﬁcation (III). The choice of the measure of the stock of married people does not change the
results either.24
This result is also robust to some alternative speciﬁcations. Our ﬁrst set of sensitivity checks
is shown in Table 10. As above, speciﬁcations (R1-I) and (R1-II) drop California and New York,
respectively. Speciﬁcation (R1-III) includes leads for the joint custody reform, and speciﬁcations
(R1-IV) and (R1-V) check for diﬀerent types of reversion to the mean. With the exception of
speciﬁcation (R1-I) and (R1-III), we ﬁnd in every case a statistically signiﬁcant increase in the
divorce rate ﬁfteen years after the introduction of joint custody. The same is true for our second
set of sensitivity checks (see Table 11), where we repeat all our alternative speciﬁcations from
Table 10, however, not only controlling for the sex-race-distribution but for the sex-race-age-
distribution of each state. Finally, in our third set of sensitivity checks (see Table 12) we include
also state-speciﬁc linear time trends and the signiﬁcant eﬀect of joint custody on divorce rates
vanishes.25
The inclusion of all divorcing couples (with and without minors) creates an additional source
of noise of our dependent variable. Joint custody does only apply to couples with minors at
the time of divorce and should have no impact on couples without minors. That means, our
sample comprises a sub-population which is by deﬁnition not aﬀected by the reform. While
this on the one hand may veil important aspects, we can on the other hand take advantage
of this setting: Couples without minors constitute a clear control group and we can apply a
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DDD) estimator.26
Unfortunately, separate ﬁgures for divorces of couples with and without minors are only
available until 1995.27 We have obtained the absolute numbers from the annual editions of the
women is constant between 1961 and 1969 and distribute the diﬀerence over the years 1961 to 1969 equally. An
equivalent procedure is applied for the 1970s to 1990s. The same procedure is applied to construct a measure of
the annual stock of married males.
24The corresponding estimation output for the number of divorces per 1;000 married males and the average of
married females and males is available upon request.
25Notably, we ﬁnd in our ﬁrst two set of robustness checks a statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on the ﬁrst lead
(one to two years before the reform). This may indicate that some spouses have pushed divorce forward before the
joint custody reform was implemented. However, in the third set of robustness checks, as well, as in our reﬁned
estimation strategy below, we do no ﬁnd any statistically signiﬁcant leads.
26Since a possible impact of the joint custody reform on fertility has not been studied so far, we can not rule
out that second dimension of our DDD estimator comprises compositional eﬀects.
27The collection of detailed information on divorcing couples was suspended beginning in January 1996. Ac-
cording to the National Center for Health Statistics limitations in the information collected by the states as well
as budgetary considerations necessitated this action (see Federal Register Notice, Dec. 15, 1995).
12Vital Statistics for all available states from 1969 to 1988 and computed the respective number
for 1989 to 1995 based on micro-level divorce certiﬁcate data provided by the National Vital
Statistics System of the National Center for Health Statistics.28 This gives us an unbalanced
panel data set of 33 states with 817 observations. On average, the divorce rate is higher among
couples with minors compared to couples without minors: 4:65 versus 3:54 divorces per 1;000 of
the adult population.
In order to exploit the control group nature of couples without minors we pool the divorce
rates of couples with minors and couples without minors. That means, we have now a stacked
data-matrix with two observations per state and year. Based on this data we run a ﬁxed-eﬀects
DDD estimation, where the dependent variable is the equal to the divorce rate (Dg;s;t) of group
g = T;C, in state s in year t,
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(3)
The binary variable G is equal to one if the observation is from the treatment group (g = T,
couples with minors) and zero if it is from the control group (g = C, couples without minors).
As before, s are state ﬁxed-eﬀects, t are year ﬁxed-eﬀects, JCr
s;t and UDr
s;t denote a series of
binary variables equal to one if a state has introduced joint custody and unilateral divorce law
r years ago. The DDD estimate is based on the change in the divorce rate of the treated in the
treatment states, netting out the change in the divorce rate of the treated in control states and
the change in the divorce rate of controls in the treatment states. In further speciﬁcations we
allow the divorce rate of the treated and controls to follow a diﬀerent path over time.
The baseline speciﬁcation (I) in Table 13 suggest that the introduction of joint custody has
decreased divorce rates, however, once we allow for group-speciﬁc linear time trends – starting
in speciﬁcation (II) – this eﬀect vanishes. It becomes apparent that divorce rates of both groups
follow ceteris paribus a secular up-ward trend, however, this is less pronounced for couples with
minors. Therefore, presuming a common trend over time, would give misleading results. Still, we
observe a positive eﬀect of joint custody on divorce rates starting ﬁfteen years after the reform in
speciﬁcation (II) and (III). Since we lose in our estimation sample early adopters such as Indiana
and New Hampshire, we also carry out an estimation, where we include only lags up to eleven
years following the reform, see speciﬁcation (IV). In this case, we do not ﬁnd any evidence for
an impact of joint custody on divorce rates. We get equivalent results if we add group-speciﬁc
ﬁxed-eﬀects and/or group-state-speciﬁc linear time trends. We also applied our DD estimation
strategy separately for the data on divorces with and without minors. The results suggest no
impact of joint custody on divorce with minors nor on divorces without minors.29
In sum, we cannot put forward any convincing evidence on the hypothesis that joint custody
had an overall impact on the incidence of divorce. However, we can not rule out that joint
custody is eﬀective through diﬀerent channels that oﬀset each other. For instance, additional
28For 17 states (AR, AZ, CO, FL, IN, LA, ME, MN, MS, NC, ND, NJ, NM, OK, TX, WA, WV) there are no
data available. In the case of 6 states (CA, DC, DE, MA, NH, SC) some observations are missing.
29Detailed output on all estimations is available upon request.
13marriages that would have not occurred under single custody may be of lower match quality
(i.e. higher likelihood of divorce), but due to increased marital-speciﬁc investments (behavioral
eﬀect) we do not observe an overall impact on divorce rates.
Finally, it should be noted that the impact of unilateral divorce law on divorce rates is only
prevalent for couples with minors. We do not ﬁnd any discernable eﬀects of unilateral divorce
law on divorces of couples without minors. This is also true for separate DD estimations. This
has not been recognized by the literature so far.
5.3 The eﬀect on the stock of married people
So far we have convincing evidence that the introduction of joint custody has increased marriage
rates and had no impact on divorce rates. Apart from the analyzes of these two ﬂow measures
it is instructive to analyze the impact on the stock of married people. This analysis should give
us the net eﬀect of the two ﬂow measures.
Again, since we have a priori no presumption whether the share of married females or males
is the right metric, we will employ three diﬀerent measures (share of married females, males
and an average of both) as dependent variables. The estimation results in Table 14 show, as
expected, that joint custody has had a clear positive impact on the stock of married people. The
eﬀect starts nine years after the reform and grows over time. The speciﬁcation which employs the
share of married females (column I) gives stronger results compared to the speciﬁcation which
relies on the share of married males (column II). It is hard to rationalize why we observe some
diﬀerences between the two metrics. However, our measures of the stock of married people are
not as precise as the two ﬂow measures employed above and it seems that the share of married
females is simply more precise as the shared of married males. The speciﬁcation based on the
average of both metrics (column III) shows the same patterns as the speciﬁcation in column I.
It suggests an increase in the stock of married people by about 1:2 percentage points starting
nine years after the reform. Over the following years this eﬀect grows to 1:8 percentage points.
In sum, we are conﬁdent that our estimations capture the correct dynamics of the reform.30
6 Dissemination of joint custody awards
The development of joint custody awards in the US over time allows us to gather additional
supportive evidence for our ﬁndings above. We check whether the dissemination of joint custody
awards ﬁts to the delayed and growing causal eﬀect of joint custody on marriage rates. Therefore,
we use divorce certiﬁcate data provided by the National Vital Statistics System of the National
Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) which provide micro-level information on divorces in the
so-called divorce-registration area. They capture the universe of divorces in small states, and a
representative sample in larger states. Information is available for the majority of states from
1968 to 1995, but the custody allocation of children is recorded only from 1989 onwards (Clarke,
1995). The data include information on the state of divorce, number of children under 18, physical
custody arrangement, duration of marriage, and the spouses’ age, race, number of marriage and
30This is also corroborated by several robustness checks summarized in Table 15
14their state of residence. There is no information on legal custody available.31
We are interested in the determinants of joint physical custody awards. Therefore, we select
all 111 state-years in which joint custody is available. The deﬁnition of joint physical custody is
a minimum of 30 percent time share with each parent.32 Table 16 shows the development of joint
custody awards over time. We exclude 3;011 cases where custody is awarded to a third person
and 7;072 cases where the custody arrangement consists of a combination of mother sole custody,
father sole custody and/or joint custody. Unfortunately, we cannot exploit the information on
the latter, since information on custody allocation is only available on a family level and not for
each child. After cleaning the data we have 179;997 observations available.
Our dependent variable JCi;s;t is equal to one if joint custody is awarded for all children of
family i (in state s in year t) and zero if sole custody is awarded for all children:
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As explanatory variables of special interest we include a variable capturing the years since joint
custody was introduced and a binary variable, ULs;t, indicating whether unilateral divorce is
available or not.33 In addition, we control for the whole set of available spouses’ characteris-
tics Xi. In diﬀerent speciﬁcations we include state ﬁxed-eﬀects, year ﬁxed-eﬀects and state-
speciﬁc linear time trends. As method of estimation we use a linear probability model with
frequency weights and we calculate robust standard errors (allowing for clustering by state and
heteroskedasticity of unknown form).
Table 17 presents the estimation results for diﬀerent speciﬁcations. Considering the richest
speciﬁcation (V) we ﬁnd that the probability of a joint custody award increases ceteris paribus by
three percentage points each year after the introduction of joint custody. This slow dissemination
of joint custody awards is consistent with the delayed and increasing causal eﬀect of joint custody
on marriage. Interestingly, our estimation reveals that a joint custody award is less likely (minus
9:2 percentage points) in states which allow for unilateral divorces. This may be explained by
the fact that unilateral divorce has changed the composition of the stock of married people. The
controls variables capturing the spouses’ characteristics show some interesting regularities which
suggest that joint custody is not randomly assigned and (self)-selection has to be considered.34
31This rich data source has hardly ever been exploited in such a disaggregated way. The only exception we are
aware of is Matouschek and Rasul (2008).
32The NCHS does not provide this deﬁnition in any oﬃcially published document, however, Kuhn and
Guidubaldi (1997) quote a personal communication with Sally C. Clarke from NCHS.
33Of the 111 state-years covered, in 59 unilateral divorce law is available.
34For instance, the probability of a joint custody arrangement increases with duration of marriage, the husband’s
age at the time of divorce, and it decreases with the number of the spouses’ prior marriages. Or, the likelihood of
joint custody arrangement is lower for non-white spouses. Further, couples with two minors at the time of divorce
are more likely to obtain joint custody compared to couples with one minor. Beyond that additional minors
reduce the probability of joint custody. This suggests that two is the optimal number of minors for a cooperative
joint custody solution.
157 The short side of the marriage market
Given that joint custody has increased the stock of married people, it would be interesting
whether joint custody has aﬀected the incentive to marry of men and women equally. Since
under the sole custody regime women in general got custody, it seems plausible that men should
have gained more from the joint custody law reform.
It is hard to measure the incentive to marry among sexes. However, a possible way is given
by survey data that directly asks individuals whether they would prefer to marry. Starting in
1976 and continuing to the present, the Monitoring the Future study asks annually a nationally
representative sample of high school seniors the same set of questions on marriage. Examining
several questions on marriage, we quickly see that the proportion of females who have a preference
for (early) marriage is consistently higher than the proportion of males.35 That means, males
are in general more reluctant to marry and represent the short side of the marriage market.
However, the gap between females and males has decreased since the seventies. For instance,
the gap between the share of females and males who are most likely to choose to getting married
in the long run (or who are already married) has decreased from 11 percentage points in 1976 to
4 percentage points in 2006. Or, if we consider the question ‘If it were just up to you, what would
be the ideal time for you to get married? we observe (see Figure 5) that the gap in the average
score from the question on the ideal time to get married’ has fallen from 0:44 points to 0:19
points.36 We can not causally link the relatively increased willingness of males to marry to the
gradual introduction of joint custody over this period of time.37 Still, this ﬁnding is consistent
with increased gains from marriage for the short side of the market and constitutes additional
supportive evidence for our ﬁndings presented above.
8 Conclusions
Under joint custody, parents share access to their child and child-rearing responsibilities even
after the divorce. We utilize the variation occurring from the diﬀerent timing of custody law
reforms across the US to identify causal eﬀects of joint custody laws on the incidence of marriage
and divorce. Our results show a clear long-run increase in marriage rates, beginning after ﬁve
years of the reform. This delayed and increasing causal eﬀect of the reform is consistent with the
gradual dissemination of joint custody awards. We ﬁnd no convincing evidence for an impact
of joint custody on divorce rates. In sum, the introduction of joint custody has had a positive
impact on the stock of married people. It has increased the stock by about 1:2 percentage points
ten years after the reform and dampened the persistent downturn in marriage, which can be
observed over the last thirty years.
Given the dominance of maternal custody under sole custody regimes, the introduction of
joint custody has plausibly increased the incentive to marry for men – the group which is typically
more reluctant to marry. Consistently, we observe that men’s stated willingness to marry has
35For a comprehensive discussion see Thornton and Young-DeMarco (2001).
36The possible answers are ‘1 = Within the next year or so, 2 = Two or three years from now, 3 = Four or ﬁve
years from now, 4 = Over ﬁve years from now and 5 = I don’t want to marry’.
37Unfortunately, we can not exploit the diﬀerent timing of the joint custody reforms across states, since the
published data from the Monitoring the Future study does not include information on the state of residence.
16relatively increased since the 1907s. Therefore, all our empirical evidence is fully consistent with
the supposition that the additional marriages due to joint custody are the result of increased
gains of marriage for men. So far the economic literature has paid little attention to the potential
far-ranging eﬀects of diﬀerent custody laws. We hope that our research stimulates further interest
in that area and further outcomes will be studied in the future. Fertility behavior seems to be a
particularly promising outcome which could help to understand the whole picture.
Our results are also clearly important for the literature studying the impact of custody law
on any (child) outcome. Firstly, we directly show that that couples with joint custody awards
are selected. Secondly, given that joint custody has an impact on the incidence of marriage, a
further potential layer of selection has to be considered. Additional marriages that would not
have occurred under single custody may change the composition of the stock of married couples.
These marginal marriages may be of lower match quality. In addition, joint custody may have
changed the investment in children within and/or outside marriage.
Like the literature on unilateral divorce law (e.g. Wolfers, 2006), our empirical analysis can
be regarded as a test of the Coase Theorem. Becker, Landes and Michael (1977) argued that
if spouses can bargain eﬃciently, the Coase theorem implies that a change in divorce law only
aﬀects the distribution of welfare within marriage, but not the incidence of marriage or divorce.
Unilateral divorce simply re-assigns the right to divorce from being held jointly, to being held
individually. Equivalently, under a sole custody regime, the right to spend time with the child
after divorce is held individually. The introduction of joint custody re-assigns this right to being
held jointly. Our results – showing that the incidence of marriage changes – can be interpreted
as evidence that spouses may be unable to bargain eﬃciently over time with the child (e.g. due
to transactions costs or the existence of private information).
Finally, our results should be of considerable interest to policy-makers. For varying reasons
the public worries about the decline in marriage and policy-makers have on their agenda to
increase marriage rates. A large number of polices have been designed in the US to increase the
incidence of marriage and to stabilize existing marriages. These comprise large media campaigns,
the re-introduction of covenant marriages (Brinig, 1999), and the removal of marriage penalties
in tax codes (Alm, Dickert-Conlin and Whittington, 1999), pension systems (Baker, Hanna and
Kantarevic, 2004) and medicaid programs (Yelowitz, 1998). In the case of joint custody no
attention was given to its potential marriage promoting eﬀect when it was considered. Our
paper is also a ﬁrst step in understanding which polices can be used to promote marriage.
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23Table 1: Year of enactment of joint custody and unilateral divorce law.a
Joint Unilateral Joint Unilateral
State custody divorce State custody Divorce
AK 1982 1935 MT 1981 1975
AL 1997 1971 NC 1979 -
AR 2003 - ND 1993 1971
AZ 1991 1973 NE 1983 1972
CA 1979 1970 NH 1974 1971
CO 1983 1971 NJ 1981 -
CT 1981 1973 NM 1982 1973
DC 1996 - NV 1981 1973
DE 1981 - NY 1981 -
FL 1979 1971 OH 1981 -
GA 1990 1973 OK 1990 1953
HI 1980 1973 OR 1987 1973
IA 1977 1970 PA 1981 -
ID 1982 1971 RI 1992 1976
IL 1986 - SC 1996 -
IN 1973 1973 SD 1989 1985
KS 1979 1969 TN 1986 -
KY 1979 1972 TX 1987 1974
LA 1981 - UT 1988 -
MA 1983 1975 VA 1987 -
MD 1984 - VT 1992 -
ME 1981 1973 WA - 1973
MI 1981 1972 WI 1979 -
MN 1981 1974 WV - -
MO 1983 - WY 1993 1977
MS 1983 -
a The coding for the introduction of joint custody law follows Brinig
and Buckley (1998). The coding for unilateral divorce is from Wolfers
(2006).
Table 2: Average marriage and divorce rates from 1969 to 2003.a
Mean S.D. Min Max
Marriage rate
All states except NV 17.45 4.73 6.77 40.98
Nevada 206.11 74.17 112.95 363.79
Divorce rate
All states except NV 8.25 2.51 0.35 16.97
Nevada 22.73 7.91 11.02 42.09
a The marriage (divorce) rate is the number of marriages (divorces)
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































34Table 13: The eﬀect of JC on divorce rates – DDD estimation.a
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Joint custody in eﬀect for
Gyears 1-2 -0.471*** (0.152) 0.040 (0.215) 0.065 (0.251) 0.063 (0.250)
Gyears 3-4 -0.636*** (0.207) 0.017 (0.301) 0.044 (0.341) 0.041 (0.340)
Gyears 5-6 -0.799*** (0.257) -0.023 (0.367) 0.007 (0.407) 0.004 (0.406)
Gyears 7-8 -0.760*** (0.200) 0.155 (0.324) 0.187 (0.368) 0.183 (0.367)
Gyears 9-10 -0.714*** (0.197) 0.287 (0.337) 0.320 (0.385) 0.316 (0.384)
Gyears 11-12 -0.574*** (0.191) 0.537 (0.356) 0.573 (0.405)
Gyears 13-14 -0.662*** (0.219) 0.560 (0.403) 0.597 (0.452)
Gyears 15+ -0.220 (0.423) 0.993* (0.508) 1.030* (0.541)
Gyears 11+ 0.632 (0.429)
Gyears minus 1-2 0.059 (0.172) 0.057 (0.172)
Gyears minus 3-4 0.105 (0.126) 0.105 (0.126)
years 1-2 0.156 (0.153) -0.100 (0.173) -0.167 (0.198) -0.181 (0.195)
years 3-4 0.229 (0.239) -0.097 (0.279) -0.175 (0.310) -0.195 (0.306)
years 5-6 0.310 (0.319) -0.078 (0.366) -0.161 (0.399) -0.183 (0.394)
years 7-8 0.187 (0.293) -0.270 (0.346) -0.363 (0.383) -0.400 (0.369)
years 9-10 0.097 (0.290) -0.403 (0.351) -0.500 (0.391) -0.536 (0.373)
years 11-12 0.020 (0.382) -0.535 (0.454) -0.641 (0.495)
years 13-14 0.254 (0.483) -0.357 (0.562) -0.474 (0.602)
years 15+ 0.288 (0.723) -0.318 (0.772) -0.445 (0.801)
years 11+ -0.621 (0.522)
years minus 1-2 -0.162 (0.132) -0.175 (0.131)
years minus 3-4 -0.076 (0.068) -0.082 (0.068)
Unilateral divorce in eﬀect for
Gyears 1-2 -0.091 (0.122) 0.018 (0.122) 0.021 (0.121) 0.020 (0.121)
Gyears 3-4 -0.574 (0.525) -0.306 (0.529) -0.313 (0.522) -0.314 (0.521)
Gyears 5-6 -0.800* (0.427) -0.382 (0.433) -0.410 (0.424) -0.411 (0.423)
Gyears 7-8 -1.065*** (0.359) -0.534 (0.348) -0.553 (0.366) -0.554 (0.365)
Gyears 9-10 -1.126*** (0.404) -0.633 (0.383) -0.637 (0.383) -0.639 (0.382)
Gyears 11-12 -1.308*** (0.441) -0.832** (0.406) -0.835** (0.406) -0.837** (0.406)
Gyears 13-14 -1.287*** (0.441) -0.764* (0.402) -0.772* (0.404) -0.774* (0.403)
Gyears 15+ -1.470*** (0.404) -1.056** (0.434) -1.061** (0.432) -1.062** (0.432)
years 1-2 -0.055 (0.192) -0.110 (0.192) -0.112 (0.193) -0.113 (0.193)
years 3-4 0.028 (0.447) -0.106 (0.448) -0.107 (0.445) -0.108 (0.445)
years 5-6 0.140 (0.403) -0.069 (0.406) -0.043 (0.401) -0.041 (0.401)
years 7-8 0.242 (0.316) -0.023 (0.316) 0.012 (0.325) 0.014 (0.325)
years 9-10 0.138 (0.351) -0.109 (0.350) -0.108 (0.347) -0.110 (0.347)
years 11-12 0.067 (0.405) -0.171 (0.390) -0.173 (0.386) -0.174 (0.386)
years 13-14 0.044 (0.431) -0.218 (0.415) -0.216 (0.412) -0.218 (0.412)
years 15+ 0.249 (0.330) 0.042 (0.349) 0.049 (0.346) 0.059 (0.347)
Control variables
G 2.764*** (0.387) 3.020*** (0.401) 3.023*** (0.404) 3.023*** (0.403)
Trend 0.125*** (0.021) 0.130*** (0.022) 0.134*** (0.020)
GTrend -0.073*** (0.015) -0.074*** (0.017) -0.074*** (0.017)
Adj. R-squared 0.879 0.889 0.889 0.888
a The dependent variable is the equal to the divorce rate (number of divorces per 1;000 of the married female population) of
group g = T;C, in state s in year t, where the treatment group (g = T) is equal to couples with minors and the control group
(g = C) equal to couples without minors. Each estimation controls for state and year ﬁxed-eﬀects. Estimated using state population
weights. Robust standard errors (allowing for clustering by state) in parentheses. The number of observations is 1;634. *, ** and
*** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10-percent level, 5-percent level, and 1-percent level, respectively.
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